

Case Study of Instability in the Middle East

*Methodology of Integrating
Historiography with Social Science
Research*

by

Frederick Betz

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*For My Wife Nancy
and Our Children Sara, Fred, David*

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Preface

1. Introduction

In historical case studies of Middle East countries, we will analyze the instability of nations – using a new methodology integrating history research and social sciences research. This integration method will demonstrate how the disciplinary social sciences can use historical studies, which together contributes to real progress in societal wisdom.

A case history of Lebanon is one example of political instability in the modern Middle East. Established as an independent state in 1946, out of the colonial rule by France, Lebanon initially was viewed as one of the most pleasing of nations.

In 1989, Thomas Friedman (a New York Times journalist) wrote: “Lebanese were forever asking me whether I had visited Beirut before their civil war began. ‘No,’ I would say, “I never had the pleasure.’ Then they would get a faraway look, and a mist of reminiscence would fog their eyes, and they would wax eloquent about how ‘life was so beautiful then – Lebanon really was the Switzerland of the Middle East.’ It certainly looked that way on the postcards: snowcapped mountains towering over Beirut, a bank on every corner and a parliament with all the trappings of a European-style democracy. But how could a city go from being a vision of heaven to a vision of hell practically overnight? Because it was a thing too good to be true, because Beirut in its heyday was a city with a false bottom.” (Friedman, 1989)

By the term 'false bottom', Friedman meant there was something basically unstable about how Lebanon's people associated with each other -- particularly in its government's ability to resist foreign interference.

How is it theoretically possible that 'nations' can have such things as 'false bottoms'? Modern sociology theory depicts all societies as having organizational structures (including political systems) which provide functional benefits to society. Talcott Parsons called this basic theory as 'structural functionalism'. (Parsons, 1967)

Yet how and why can some societal structures fail to provide beneficial functions to society and even become 'dysfunctional'? This is a major methodological problem in the social science disciplines. These disciplines (sociology, political science, economics, psychology, management science, etc.) all provide important theories about society. But such theories do not always exist in any given society at any given time in its history. As examples, the histories of Lebanon and other states in the Middle East all have shown historical disfunction (as well as some beneficial functions).

What is needed is a methodology in social science research which distinguishes between 'theory' and 'reality'. And this is the topic we address in this book – 'normative theory' versus 'empirical reality'. We will show how a methodology of cross -disciplinary research (between the discipline of history and the disciplines of the social sciences) is needed to address this basic problem. Only in this method can the social sciences contribute valid theory to assist in societal 'progress' – progress toward attaining useful and real 'societal wisdom'.

This need for a cross-disciplinarity research method is motivated by the following questions:

1. Why have modern industrialized societies not been stable in peace, nor just in wealth, nor preservative of life on earth? Despite all the major progress in science -- particularly progress in the physical, chemical, biological and mathematical sciences -- modern societies are often neither stable nor just in government nor conservative of Earth and its Life.
2. In contrast, why have the social science disciplines not been able to advance scientific knowledge to assist modern societies -- helping policy makers understand how to achieve universal stability, prosperity, justice, and sustainability?
3. What methodology should the social science disciplines use, along with the discipline of history, for the social sciences to become really scientific?

2. Nature, Science, and the Disciplines of Science.

In science, the concept of 'nature' indicates the reality of what we observe -- above us, beneath us, around us and by us.

Physical nature above us is the starry sky up and out beyond sun and all the galaxies of the universe -- from now and back to the 'big bang' of the creation of the cosmos about 14 billion years ago.

Physical nature beneath us is the earth, its crust, its mantle and down into its hot magnetic core and its eons of time of existence (about 5 billion years in which the earth was formed around a new star, which we now call the 'Sun').

Physical nature around us is the environment of air, land, and sea and all their life -- populated as bacteria, virus, fungi, plants and animals (evolved in and from the sea about 4 billion years ago).

For research and for teaching, science has been organized into disciplines: (1) the physical, chemical, biological, and environmental sciences which study physical/living nature and (2) social sciences and history which study human social and organizational nature. Also, mathematics is a discipline of logic used to structure expression and modeling in disciplines about nature. Computer science and artificial intelligence are cognitive techniques useful to methodology in science and organizational practices in society,

In the physics-chemistry-biological disciplines, the key philosophical ideas are that (1) there are scientific laws which underlay natural phenomena and (2) these laws are immutable and invariant.

For example, in physics, the speed of light is constant, as measured by all and any observers (Einstein's Law of Special Relativity). Moreover, this Law is realistically observable then (e.g. Michael-Morrison Experiment), today (e.g. atomic clocks in orbit compared to atomic clocks on Earth), and in the future (very likely).

For example, in biology, Darwin's theory of Evolution depicts how biological change occurs from genetic variation that adapts generations of species to successful survival in environments. All life is formed upon a carbon-based chemistry, which requires continual inputs of energy from an environment -- for the chemistry of biological processes to proceed forward as life. Evolution happens as genetic variation improves the possibility of a life form to gain energy and survive. Also because of the chemical processes of life require continual inputs of energy, the stopping of biological processes, in a living form, results in death. Life is time-dependent upon generations and survival-dependent upon environment.

From such examples, we see that all the physical, chemical, and biological sciences observe and formulate scientific theory that is 'general' and 'immutable' – universal and unchangeable.

In contrast for the history and social science disciplines, the key philosophical ideas are 'normative laws' and 'empirical events'. Events which actually occur in the history of a society provide empirical explanations for why societies change. But how societies should operate is prescribed by 'normative laws'. But the problem is this.. Why in any society's history has its empirical events (reality) not always followed its normative laws (ideals)?

Normative laws (ideals) express what is desirable to occur in the history of a society which would benefit the occupants of the society. But a society's ideals and reality do not always coincide.

Thus, in the disciplines of history and the social sciences, there are no immutable and universal laws.

This is the challenge for methodology of research in the disciplines of history and the social sciences. How can the social sciences create general theory' about how and why societies are stable and beneficial to humanity -- even when empirical history demonstrates this is not actually occurring?

Why can normative laws in the social sciences (desirable rules of society) not be immutable (always exist in reality)? The reason is in any society at any historical time, it may be possible for individuals/factions to corrupt social systems. One example is how in the 1900s, Hitler's Nazi Party took over German government. The Imperial German Government failed in the First World War in 1918. Then a Nazi German Government corrupted German society in 1933 and began the Second World War in 1939. A society of 'good people' was

corrupted by a change of 'government' into a society of some very 'evil people'.

How this kind of corruption of a universal societal norm of 'good' to 'evil' can happen in any society in any history is the topic we explore in the cases in this book – which are the case histories of the states of the modern Middle East.

For this analysis, we propose a scientific method for observation and theory which links the discipline of history to the disciplines of the social sciences. We call this methodological approach of using history as an observational basis toward a science of society as a 'problématique' about the nature of society'.

Why use the term 'problématique'? This French word 'problématique' means the presentation of a problem which raises a question that must be resolved. And in contemporary society, there is an urgent need for present social science disciplines to do research using a proper methodology upon which to establish societal norms as universal – a 'problématique' for cross-disciplinary research by 'history & sciences'.

Some of the most glaring historical problematiques of modern society presently are: (1) 'Nuclear Armageddon' and (2) fossil-energy-fueled 'Climate Change'. One can list many more problematiques, such as availability of fresh water, environmental sustainability, preservation of wild species, handling of pandemics, safety from famine, universal employment, equitable distribution of wealth and prosperity, safety from armed militias, and so on. These are some of the many questions about the nature of modern society.

These 'problematiques' have been with our civilization for a long time, as can be illustrated by a book Erich Fromm wrote back in 1941

'Escape From Freedom' which analyzes the phenomenon of humanity's anxiety – "engendered by the breakdown of the Medieval World, in which, in spite of many 'dangers', many had felt secure and safe. After centuries of struggles, humanity succeeded in building an undreamed-of wealth of material goods and he built democratic societies in parts of the world . . . Yet modern man still is anxious and tempted to surrender its freedom to dictators of all kinds . . . Moreover, the most important event in this century (1900s) is the discovery of atomic energy and its use as a weapon of destruction. Never before in history has the human race been confronted with total annihilation, least of though the work of its own hands." (Fromm,1941)

This is the basic problematic of our scientific-technological-industrialized society. Can *humanity rule itself for its benefit and progress or instead lapse into totalitarianisms and/or annihilation?*

3. Present Civilization of Scientific Technology and Innovation

Why is the nature of modern society so especially problematic? It is because modern society was constructed upon an 'industrial revolution' which was based upon the new sciences of physics and chemistry and mathematics and their derivative technologies. And why are 'history & social sciences' now so important to societal policies?

It is because the complexities of societies created by the 'industrial revolution have made such societies unstable, dangerous, and liable to injustice. (For example, as we shall review in a later chapter, in Syria the government dropped barrels of dynamite on citizens in its own cities.)

Can solutions be found to societal problematics from the knowledge and wisdom created by integrated research in the disciplines of history and social sciences? This is the question.

All of modern society has been based upon modern scientific technology in the physical, chemical, biological, mathematics disciplines – along with industry and agriculture operating mostly upon energy from fossil fuel. As a new science-technology civilization, this historically began in England at the end of the seventeenth century and later spread around the world

Yet even in this science/technology civilization, the social sciences have not yet created the practical knowledge of how to operate such societies stably or beneficially or with sustainability. Why?

Because previous researches have been in disciplinarily silos and have been unscientific -- producing normative laws/theories without empirical validity.

To correct this, we need a valid scientific methodology for the social sciences based upon history (social science theories based upon the empirical observation of real societies).

Cross-disciplinary research of history & science is required to generate a deeper understanding of the impact of innovation upon societal function and structure. We need to perceive how innovation has created modern economic development in industrialized societies and also has also created modern political instability.

After the beginning of science in the 1600s, all new major technologies after 1700 have been invented upon knowledge bases of science. Figure 1 lists some historically important innovations, and one can see that most occurred after 1700.

HISTORICALLY IMPORTANT INNOVATIONS

INNOVATION	FUNCTION	DATE
TOOLS	TECHNOLOGY	PRE-HISTORY
POTTERY	MATERIALS	STONE AGE
BRONZE	MATERIALS	2500s BC
WRITING	LITERACY	2500s BC
IRON	MATERIALS	1500s BC
GUN	WEAPONS	1300s AD
PRINTING	LITERACY	1400s
TELESCOPE	OPTICS	1500s
MICROSCOPE	SCIENCE	1700s
STEAM ENGINE	POWER	1700s
POWERED MACHINERY	PRODUCTION	1700s
RAILROADS	TRANSPORTATION	1830s
TELEGRAPH	COMMUNICATIONS	1850s
CHEMICALS	MATERIALS	1850s
STEAM SHIPS	TRANSPORTATION	1860s
CAMERAS	IMAGES	1860s
TELEPHONE	COMMUNICATIONS	1880s
ELECTRIC LIGHTING	ILLUMINATION	1880s
ELECTRICAL POWER	POWER	1880s
BICYCLES	TRANSPORTATION	1880s
AUTOMOBILES	TRANSPORTATION	1890s
AIRPLANES	TRANSPORTATION	1900s
PLASTICS	MATERIALS	1900s
MOVIES	COMMUNICATIONS	1910s
ELECTRON TUBES	ELECTRONICS	1910s
RADIO	COMMUNICATIONS	1920s
RADAR	SENSING	1930s
SPACE ROCKETS	TRANSPORTATION	1930s
NUCLEAR FISSION	WEAPONS	1930s
TELEVISION	COMMUNICATIONS	1930s
COMPUTERS	COMPUTATION	1940s
TRANSISTORS	ELECTRONICS	1940s
SATELLITES	TRANSPORTATION	1950s
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS	ELECTRONICS	1950s
COMPUTER NETWORKS	COMMUNICATIONS	1970s

Figure 1: Historically Important Innovations. (And in the 2010-20s, one can add to this list the innovations of artificial intelligence in computer science and CRISPR in biology).

Note how rare were technological innovations up until the 1700s -- tools, pottery, bronze, writing, iron, gun, printing, telescope. Then note how many technological innovations began after the 1700s.

This dramatic increase in the rate of technological innovation was due to the creation of science in Europe in the 1600s. After science, inventing new technologies was more possible than previously. This

is the phenomenon, which we now call “scientific technology” -- technological innovation made upon a scientific base of knowledge.

In 1695, modern science began when Newton published *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (*Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*) It described a new paradigm for physical models of force systems (Copernican model of the solar system). And the enormous numbers of innovations after 1700 are due to this creation of science in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century. Isaac Newton combined new ideas of physics (due to Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo) with new ideas in mathematics (due to Descartes and others) and invented the mathematical theory of space, time and forces (the Newtonian paradigm of physics).

In the next century of the 1700s, these new ideas were further developed into the new scientific disciplines of physics, chemistry, and mathematics. The centuries of the 1800s and 1900s found dramatic advances in these disciplines, along with the founding of the scientific discipline of biology. By the end of the 1900s, the physics of the small parts of matter and the largest spaces of matter was established, the chemistry of inanimate and animate matter was established, the molecular biology of the inheritance of life was established, and the computational science of mind and communication was being extended. In the four hundred years of the origin and development of science and scientific technology as a period of the *globalization of science*.

Yet, in contrast to this international context of science, economic and technological developments occurred within national contexts. Each nation industrialized on a national basis and in competition with other nations. From about 1765 to about 1865, the principal industrialization occurred in the European nations of England, France, and Germany. From 1865 to about 1965 (the second hundred years) other European

nations began industrializing; but the principal industrialization shifted to North America.




Figure 2. Timelines of Science, Technology, & Economy

By the middle of the twentieth century in the 1940s, the U.S. industrial capacity was alone so large and innovative as to be a determining factor in the conclusion of the Second World War of that century. For the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. industrial prowess continued and also took the lead in R&D for science and technology. The European nations rebuilt their industrial capabilities that had been destroyed by the war. From 1950 to the end of the twentieth century, several Asian countries began emerging as globally-competitive industrial nations: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore.

After the economic reforms in China by Deng Xiaoping, China began to rapidly industrialize, quickly becoming a major manufacturing

nation in the world in the twenty-first century. This was assisted by the global firms in the United States, which began outsourcing manufacturing to China (particularly in consumer electronics). The communist government in China absorbed the cost of building new manufacturing facilities in China, to the standards of American designs.

Also, India, after beginning to throw off decades of socialism, began to industrialize, particularly in the information technologies. All other Asian countries were moving toward globally-competitive capability: South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia. (One can note that historically Asian industrialization began in Japan in 1865-- but was diverted principally to a military-dominated society. After the second world war, a re-industrialization of Japan occurred.)

In summary, there was a pattern of three hundred years of world industrialization in which different regions of the world began to develop globally-competitive industrial societies:

- (1) first hundred years (1765-1865) -- Europe,
- (2) second hundred years (1865-1965) -- North America,
- (3) third hundred years (1965-2065) -- Asia.

4. Science, Technology, and Economy – Research & Development (R&D)

Modern innovation now occurs within ‘national systems of innovation’, which perform significant R&D. Here is the dominant fact about industrial progress and R&D.

The nations which do the most R&D in the world have the largest economies in the world.

The national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) correlates with national R&D. One can see this in the levels of global research & development (R&D) in the large GDP areas, Figure 3. Therein one sees that only North America (\$492 billion), Europe (\$367 billion), and East and Southeast Asia (\$614 billion) have significant levels in the hundreds of billion U.S. dollars.




Figure 3: Global R&D Expenditures, by Region in 2013 (Source: NSF Science Indicators 2016)

The next interesting thing about global R&D is that it is performed in national contexts, within nations. Plotting the size of a nation's R&D against a nation's GDP shows vividly that unless a nation invests in R&D, its economy cannot effectively compete on a global scale, Figure 4.




Figure 4: Expenditures on R&D 1981-2013 (Source: NSF Science Indicators 2016)

After the Second World War in the twentieth century, the United States become the largest investor in R&D (science & technology) and continued into the twenty-first century, as the largest with an R&D expenditure of \$450 billion dollars. The European Union nations also have one of the largest GDP and an R&D expenditure of \$340 billion. After the communist China’s economic reforms under Deng, China’s GDP grew as a supplier of manufactured goods to US companies. China’s state companies also invested in R&D so that by 2013, it equaled the EU expenditures.

A nation’s expenditure on R&D is a significant cost to a nation, and the statistics of R&D expenditure as a share of GDP (R&D/GDP) by a nation shows that a range of 2% to 4% is necessary for a nation to be globally competitive, Figure 5.




Figure 5: R&D Expenditures as % of GDP 1981-2013 (Source: NSF Science Indicators 2016)

By 2013, the United States expenditure ratio (R&D/GDP) has been around 2.5%. Germany’s ratio climbed to 3.5%. South Korea’s ratio climbed to 4%. Japan’s ratio rose to 2%. The United Kingdom’s ratio fell to 1.6%. China’s ratio rose to 2%. India’s ratio is around 0.8%. And Russia’s ration was just above 1%.

What is striking is that the Asian countries of Japan and South Korea were committing a high percentage of their GDP to R&D, since they knew that science and technology are central factors in national competitiveness. A third Asian country, China, was rapidly increasing their percentage investment in science and technology. The US, Germany, France, United Kingdom were holding steady in their percentage investment in R&D. Russia and India were then not seriously committed to the cost of becoming a high-tech economy.




Figure 6: Innovation is an intellectual process of Research, Invention, Commercialization, and Marketing.

What the R&D investment money does in a nation is fund the innovation process: (1) which gains information from science about nature, (2) transforms this into inventing new technology or improving existent technology, (3) commercialized as new or improved products/services, (4) which earn profits in a market. Overall, the process connects two ways of viewing the world: either as ‘material’ or as “money’. Accordingly in the innovation process, both knowledge and wealth are connected together.

This is why countries which have invested in innovation (R&D) have financially prospered (GDP).

As institutions in innovation, universities have been the primary source of scientific progress. Industries have been the primary source of technological progress. Governments have been the primary source of funding science and development of radical innovation. Thus, historically in this global world, the different research sectors have

sometimes cooperated, toward some national strength and competitiveness, using Science & Technology & Innovation.

By reviewing the statistics and process relating R&D to GDP, we have reviewed the enormous contributions to the industrialization and growth of nations which the academically organized physical sciences (Physical and Chemical, and Biological and Mathematics Disciplines, along with Engineering Disciplines) have made. And while all these science and engineering disciplines are organized academically into 'silo' departments, industrial research (in pursuit of innovations) has helped integrate enough of their knowledge to economically benefit societies. Yet why haven't political organizations of the world similarly integrated the 'silo' organized social sciences enough to create progress in justice, stability, wealth, peace? We have emphasized this as the 'problematique of social science and historical research methodology' -- which we address in this book.

To illustrate how to integrate historical research with social science research, we will analyze the real historical cases of societal collapse in the Middle East -- how and why the failures occurred. From this cross-disciplinarity analysis, we will see that failures in the Middle East did not have to happen. No failure was necessitated by human nature -- but it all happened by failures of human wisdom (assisted by corruption and failures of leadership).

Historical studies need to be integrated with interdisciplinary social sciences research for history to contribute valid theory (as grounded wisdom) for societal operations: (1) for progress in the stability and sustainability of modern societies and (2) for regulation against corruption,

This following quotation is from famous physicist Max Planck: "Experiments are the only means of knowledge at our disposal. The rest is poetry, imagination."

It is in this spirit of science, we say: "Histories are the only means of verifying social sciences knowledge. The rest is poetry, imagination."

Frederick Betz 2026

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Chapter 1

The Case of the Failed State of Lebanon

1. Introduction

From the case history of Lebanon down to the case history of war in Iran, we will learn how and why the modern world needs 'empirically-grounded' social science theory, grounded by historical studies, to guide the creation of political policy wisdom. The basic issues we are addressing include the following:

1. Why have modern industrialized societies not been stable in peace? Despite all the major progress in science, particularly in the physical, chemical, biological and mathematical sciences, we have advanced progress in societal power but not in societal justice?
2. Technical progress has contributed to the development of our scientific/technological civilization. Yet why have the social science disciplines not been able to advance wisdom in our 'scientific/technological civilization' -- to assist policy makers in achieving universal stability, prosperity, justice, and sustainability?
3. What methodology should the social science disciplines use along with the discipline of history, for the social sciences to become really scientific?

In the science disciplines of physics, chemistry, and biology, the key philosophical ideas are that (1) there are scientific laws which underlay natural phenomena and (2) these laws are immutable and invariant (unchangeable and independent of observer). Yet in

contrast, no theory in the social sciences can ever be methodologically immutable and invariant.

Why? The reason is that individuals and/or factions in a society can corrupt the laws (theories) of societal systems, often and at any time or any place. Societal corruption is a universal problem for stability in any modern society.

This is because of a basic sociological idea about societies, which is that societies are formed as 'functional structures' (i.e. organizations and organizational processes). This idea, called 'structural functionalism' was expressed by Talcott Parsons in the social science discipline of American sociology. (Parsons, 1967) But 'corruption' can alter the functionality in a society into 'disfunction'.

'Corruptibility' is one basis for real problems in all societies -- in terms of their stability, safety, and justice.

2. Case History: Lebanon

We start with the tragic case of instability in the history of Lebanon. Lebanon offers a sad example of what happens to people when their government fails to safeguard their needs.

After Lebanon's independence in 1946 and until its civil war began in 1975, Lebanon was a state with Sunni Muslims and Christians sharing power, both being the majorities of population in the cities. In the mountains of Lebanon were populations of Druze and Christians. In the countryside south of Beirut, Shia Muslims were the main population, living in farming villages. Life was peaceful in Lebanon and delightful in its capital of Beirut. But then in 1967, an association of Middle East governments (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan) calling itself the 'Arab League' sent the Palestinian refugees in Jordanian camps

out of Jordan into Lebanon. This happened after the Palestinian refugee leader Arafat (of the Palestine Liberation Organization PLO) had attempted to take over the Jordanian government.

Next in Lebanon, the PLO operated as a 'state-within-a-state' and continued to launch attacks into Israel. In 1975 the Lebanese Army clashed with the PLO militia and a civil war broke out. Maronite Christians played a large role in the clash as officers in the Lebanese Army. Muslim groups in Lebanon sided with the PLO. The civil war tore Lebanon apart.

Thomas Friedman wrote: "Lebanon was never the Switzerland of the Middle East. It was always the Tower of Babel. . . The first and largest of these wars was the one that began in 1975 and culminated in the Shouf in 1984; the civil war over who should control the Lebanese government, which was fought out between the Christian and Muslim militias. It was this confrontation which had broken Beirut and Lebanon in half. That second civil war began after 1975. It involved Muslims fighting against Muslims and Christians fighting Christians to decide which Muslims and which Christians would control their respective halves of Lebanon. . . The third civil war was a silent civil war . . It pitted all the Christian and Muslim militiamen who benefited from Lebanon's chaos on the one side and all the Lebanese civilians who suffered from that chaos on the other." (Friedman,2019)

In Lebanon in 1984, Thomas Friedman had personally experienced the rampage of 'militia': He wrote: "'My first glimpse of Beirut's real bottom came at the Commodore Hotel bar on February 7, 1984 – the day after the Druze and the Shiite Amal militias had seized control of West Beirut from the Lebanese army. Groups of Shiite militiamen, belonging to the radical pro-Iranian organization Hezbollah (Party of God), had gone on a rampage that morning, ransacking heathen bars and whorehouses just off West Beirut's Hara Street. . . I was enjoying

a 'quiet' lunch in the Commodore restaurant that day when I heard a ruckus coming from the lobby. I turned around and saw a tall, heavysset Shiite militiaman with a black beard, a wild look in his eyes, and an M-16 in his hands heading for the bar. . . He stalked behind the bar and began smashing every liquor bottle and glass with his rifle butt. He didn't miss a single one. When he was done, he stalked out of the lobby, leaving behind a small lake of liquor on the floor and a stunned crowd of journalists frozen to their chairs. The scene was terrifying on many levels . . . He had Truth with a capital T, and he was from a party of God, and nothing could stop him. . . He was a Lebanese. He had been living for years in the same city with us, and we really never knew he was . . . With his rifle butt, he not only smashed the Commodore bar but also right through Beirut's false bottom. . . to reveal a tribal wrath that had been building in intensity for decades beneath the surface." (Friedman, 1989)

It was earlier in 1964 when Palestine refugees were encamped in Jordan, and the Arab League (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) recognized and began financially supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its military arm, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Next a second Arab-Israeli war occurred in 1968, triggered by the Egypt's sea blockade of Israel. A surprise attack by Israeli Air Force destroyed the Egyptian Air Force; and next the Israeli Army seized the Sinai from Egypt. Then the Israeli Army seized the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank of Palestine from Jordan. Palestine refugees fled into Jordan (after Israel's occupation of the West Bank). In Jordan in 1970, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) attempted to take over the Jordanian government. But the Palestinians were expelled into Lebanon by the Jordan government's army. Kail Ellis wrote: "Syria, Israel, and the Palestinians had influenced Lebanon's political system, and each continued to be inextricably involved in Lebanon's internal affairs The Arab-

Israeli war of 1948 left Lebanon as host to an estimated 141,882 Palestinians. And twenty-five years later that number grew to as many as 400,000." (Ellis, 1999)

Both the Israelis and the Arab League were responsible for the intrusion of Palestinian refugees into Jordan. And because of the second influx of Palestinians into Jordan and their rule by the PLO, the Lebanese government (divided between Christians and Sunni Muslims and Druze and Shia Muslims) never had a chance to evolve the Lebanese state into a patriotic unified nation -- with an army strong enough to protect Lebanon from refugee influxes. Kail Ellis wrote: "The Lebanese government had three pressing needs: (1) to find a way to disclaim responsibility for the Palestinians' actions, in order to ward off Israeli retaliation; (2) to maintain the fig leaf of Lebanese sovereignty, in order to satisfy its domestic critics; and (3) to be seen as an advocate of the Palestinian cause to its opposition parties and Muslim constituencies. . . . But the Cairo Agreement (of the Arab League) gave the Palestinians the right of autonomous administrative control over their refugee camps in Lebanon -- (letting the PLO) use the Palestine camps as bases for installing weapons and recruiting resident Palestinians for resistance." (Ellis, 1999)

After Jordan's government expelled the PLO from its territory, the Arab League forced Lebanon's government to take in the PLO. Why had not the Arab League forced Israeli to take back the Palestinians into the West Bank? Farid El Khazen wrote: "The predominate issue after 1967 was the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . . The emergence of the Palestinian revolution occurred at a time when the Arab political space had reached a saturation point. Those radical regimes that lost territory in the 1967 war (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) became more cautious and more calculating. . . . All this occurred at a time when the PLO, now in its militant phase, sought to carve out a pace of its own on the

regional and international political map. . . With a de facto Palestinian 'state' in exile seeking to assert itself in a closed Arab state system, the state in Lebanon found itself locked in a power struggle with other Arab states . . . Why (had) Lebanese authorities failed to adopt a 'Jordanian solution' to the PLO armed presence?" (El Khazen, 2000)

The Lebanese government as a structured coalition of different ethnic groups did not have an army unified and strong enough to expel the PLO from Lebanon. From 1970 to 1974, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) established a 'state-within-a-state' in the Lebanese territory.

As earlier the PLO had attempted to take over the Jordanian state, next the Lebanese Maronite (Christians) feared a PLO takeover of Lebanon. Maronite militias and Maronite officers in the Lebanese Army together launched attacks on the PLO. This triggered a civil war in which the Christian militias and PLO and Muslim militias fought each other (with the PLO militia supporting the Muslim militias). The Syrian Army intervened to support the Muslim militias. Farid El-Khazen wrote: "Between 1974 and the early 1980s, Lebanon became the 'legitimate' battleground for Arab and Palestinian feuds. With the tacit approval of Israel, Syria was allowed to take the upper hand. During that period Lebanon's internal balance altered dramatically. Two major factions controlled the country and eventually evolved into the two interlocutors with the greatest firepower: Maronite-led Christian militias on one side, and Syria and the PLO (with additional Lebanese factions) on the other. The PLO emerged from the 1975-1980 Lebanese civil war as the de facto sovereign authority in most Muslim-inhabited regions. It also succeeded in establishing international recognition for its undeclared 'state in exile' whose capital was in West Beirut. It had acquired the military, political, and propaganda

infrastructure of a state, in full revolutionary momentum.” (El-Khazen, 1986)

Then in 1982, Israel decided to eliminate the PLO in Lebanon, by invading Lebanon. Farid El-Khazen wrote: “The Camp David treaty between Israel and Egypt was a strategic turning point in regional politics, paving the way for Israel's decision to terminate the Palestinian presence in Beirut. The other development was the erosion of popular support for the Palestinians among all Lebanese communities, including their most trusted allies. Over the years the Palestinians blackmailed and humiliated so many of their Lebanese friends that they lost any sympathy among the population. This helps explain the initial positive reaction of the Lebanese to the Israeli invasion. The thin veil of pan-Arab ideological affinity that had helped protect the PLO had become totally transparent by 1982. . . . The 1982 war also made clear that militant revolutionary politics had failed. After Beirut, young zealots and free-lance Arab ideologues were deprived of the last bastion of rhetorical Arab nationalism and the only remaining testing ground for the mobilization of the masses. For, starting in the early 1970s, Beirut had gradually become the Arab world's ideological jungle and, as such, the last refuge of the marginal tendencies in the Arab state system.” (El-Khazen, 1986)

The Israeli Army invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had expelled the PLO; but the Israeli Army continued occupying southern Lebanon until 1990 -- thereby creating a new militia in Lebanon, the Shia ‘Hezbollah’. El Khazen wrote: “Of all Lebanese communities, the Shia were the most affected by the Palestinian era in wartime Lebanon. Not only did the PLO polarize Shia communal politics, it turned the south into an open battlefield with Israel. . . . Clashes between PLO guerrillas and the Shia began prior to the Israeli invasion in 1982 and continued afterwards in the ‘war of the camps’ in Beirut between Syrian-backed

Amal and Palestinian forces in the mid -1980s. As war continued, the process of Shia radicalization was accelerated . . . Iran's influence on the Shia community was overwhelming at all political, social and religious levels." (El Khazen, 2000)

Also, in addition to foreign interference, Lebanon became a failed state because few leaders in Lebanon had placed the value of the nation above the value of each leader's religious group/clan. Without unity and a strong military force, Lebanon was unable to resist continual invasions by foreign peoples and governments. And at the end of the Lebanese Civil War, the one chance Lebanese had for real integration under a unifying national leader, Rafik Harari, also failed -- due to the influence of two foreign governments, Syria and Iran, over militant Lebanese Hezbollah. Rafik Hariri was assassinated.

Due to a continuous lack of a strong national leadership, the Lebanese state never evolved into a unified nation; and for proponents of a 'democratic form' of government (as opposed to an 'authoritarian form'), this outcome for Lebanon is sad. Farid El Khazen wrote: "The state in Lebanon did not practice the most widely used instrument of control in the Arab world (as well as in other Third world countries) - - organized repression practiced by the state's 'institutions of violence'. Lebanon was one of the few Arab countries which had no secret police and on state-sponsored militia . . . Moreover, Lebanon was the only Arab country which held regular parliamentary and presidential elections. . . Lebanon was also the only Arab country which enjoyed fairly open borders and imposed no restrictions on travel. No people disappeared while on their way in or out of the country. Nor were there restrictions on the transfer of money. Lebanon had an open market economy and an internationalized private-run banking system. If by Arab standards 'the republic of fear' was the norm, particularly in states with which Lebanon had to