Applied Moral Education in Korea

Good Governance Guidelines and Policy Prescriptions

Edited by

Brendan M. Howe and John Gyun Yeol Park

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Preface

To our esteemed readers,

It is with immense pride and a deep sense of honor that we present this book. More than just a collection of academic work, this volume represents a pivotal moment and a new beginning for moral education in Korea. We are confident that this book will serve as a crucial milestone in the journey of Korean moral education onto the world stage.

For too long, the profound insights and dedicated research of Korean scholars have been constrained by language barriers, limiting their ability to share their work with the global academic community. Today, however, Korea has cultivated a robust infrastructure of scholars who can communicate and publish their research in English. This book is the first fruit of that mature environment and a vital voice that will introduce the excellence of Korean moral education to the international community.

All of the co-authors who contributed to this book are members of the Korea Association for Public Value (KAPV) (https://www.kapv.kr). The KAPV was founded to expand academic exchange with both Korean and foreign scholars on the topic of public value, and it publishes an English-language journal, the *Journal of Public Value*. This book is a valuable product of this very academic exchange.

Korea's system for moral education is, in many ways, unique and ideal. The Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation (KICE), an agency under the Ministry of Education, is at the heart of this system. KICE ensures the consistent and systematic operation of the curriculum, from the 'Moral Education' courses in elementary and middle schools to the 'Ethics' courses in high schools. Furthermore, specialized universities for elementary school teachers and separate colleges of education for middle and high school teachers are well-established. This systematic infrastructure and national dedication provide a strong foundation for the effective implementation of moral education. This book seeks to capture this unique system and Korea's rich experience in moral education.

A particularly noteworthy aspect of this book is its in-depth exploration of moral education in the context of Korea's unique circumstances. The book delves into moral dilemmas stemming from the nation's division, as well as issues of peace and reunification. These topics offer valuable inspiration and insight to moral education experts in other countries. For his unwavering dedication and passionate efforts as a co-editor, we extend our deepest gratitude and respect to Professor Brendan M. Howe of Ewha Womans University. This book would not have been possible without his spirit of service to the community.

Finally, we wish to express our sincere appreciation to Ethics International Press for transforming our valuable work into this

exceptional book. We hope this volume will contribute to the advancement of Korean moral education and serve as a meaningful resource that offers new perspectives and inspiration to readers worldwide.

Thank you.



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Introduction: Applying Ethics through Principled Education

Brendan Howe

Introduction

This volume, *Applied Ethics Education in Korea*, is one of a series of books on "Moral Education in Korea" produced by the *Korean Association for Public Value*. Education is a normative human right, but it also serves a practical function of improving domestic and international governance performance. Those who govern have an obligation to provide conditions of peace and security, to reconcile conflicts of interest, and to generate collective good, all while abiding by the rule of law. Those who are governed likewise have obligations, firstly towards their fellow citizens, but also to conceptualizations of the wider body politic, to the collective good, and towards those who govern in the interests of society through resolving collective action problems.

Education is key to training those who would govern, but also to training citizens to recognizing when the instruments of government (both actors and institutions) fail to adhere to the principles of good governance. Furthermore, education provides the foundation for concepts of good citizenship among civil society. The chapters in this book reflect upon the myriad ways in which supporting education and capacity-building training programs can not only bring benefit to the recipients, but also to the wider

communities to which they belong. These include building resilience through empowering civil society, promoting democratic governance through civic education, building peace within and between societies, using education and training as tools of development, the public diplomacy role of educational scholarships, and the internationalization of learning environments. The transformative nature of principled education can have a remarkable impact when applied to policy platforms within the state and beyond its borders.

The Korean people have always set great store in the importance of applied moral education and have supported it at the programmatic level across regime types, whether under the auspices of the imperial system, authoritarian governments, or liberal democratic governments. Indeed, as is addressed in this volume, even in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),[1] this concern with the vital role of applied moral education has been manifest. Yet it is within the Republic of Korea (ROK),[2] that normative ethical principles have come truly to dominate the discourse on how best to educate for good governance. South Korea is ranked as having the most educated workforce in the world, with a literacy rate of 97.9%, and a tertiary education rate (college completion) of 70% of people aged 25 to 34 (Vanguard, 2024). North Korea has an even higher literacy rate of 100%, with free and compulsory education for 12 years beginning

[1] The terms North Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are used interchangeably in this chapter.
[2] The terms South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Korea are used interchangeably in this chapter.

at age 5. The tertiary education sector is, however, a lot less accessible than in South Korea.

With such diverse and even antagonistic regimes claiming to support applied moral education, it is important to establish the parameters for that morality. Which ethics are best suited to be operationalized in civic education and training programs? Also, how have these principles been practically implemented, and with what success? These are the questions tackled by the substantive chapters of this volume.

The Korean "Miracle" on the Han River

Since its founding as a modern state in 1948, the ROK has experienced a triple miracle on the Han River. First, it has developed from one of the poorest countries in the world to a top ten global economy. Second, it has successfully transitioned to and then consolidated as a liberal democracy (albeit with some bumps along the road). Third, it has done so under conditions of being a conflict affected state. The stimuli behind this impressive performance fall into two broad groupings – exogenous, whereby external factors and agencies contributed to dramatic economic and political governance performance, and endogenous, whereby the internal growth engines and policies were responsible for growth of a magnitude sufficient to achieve escape velocity from the transformation trap (Howe, 2020: 19).

External stimuli include reparations from Japan, official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) from the international community, especially the United States (U.S.), the demand-led boom fueled by the Vietnam War,

and engagement with the international trading system. Internal stimuli include the much-vaunted developmental state and related protectionist policies, ownership of the country's development experience despite pressure from the donors, and, as is highlighted by this book, a focus on education, capacity-building, and civic virtue.

In truth, the interrelations and synergies between these elements makes any attempted analytical dichotomy overly simplistic. Essentially the ROK was able, through internal societal and governance mechanisms, to harness and exploit the opportunities afforded by the external operating environment, forces, and actors. As pointed out by Bradford (2015: 12), "[t]he South Korean success story is a story about intentionality, about the capacity of a society to define its future rather than to be passively lifted by market forces alone, and about the role of leadership, institutions, and narrative in determining destiny." The prioritization of human capacity-building and education in the ROK does merit special consideration, however. Economic growth and human capacity-building have interacted throughout the history of Korea's attempt to escape the transformation trap (Howe, 2020: 21), and both donor and government-led economic development plans have been directly reflected in education policy and planning (Lee, 1997).

Between 1948 and 1961, 66% of foreign aid was intended to promote Korean administration and development through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), and the remaining 34% was emergency relief and reconstruction (Suh and Kim, 2014: 60). The U.S. intended to make Korea a successful case of economic and political transition, and therefore US policy centered on the

construction of a new Korean government, which could provide sufficient administration for these tasks (ibid: 62-63). The competence of bureaucrats is an essential component of the administrative capacity to effectively carry out governmental actions (Huber and McCarty, 2004). U.S. aid indirectly influenced the performance of the Korean government by developing public officials' capacity through technical assistance programs. Moreover, the Rhee and Park administrations put a special emphasis on bureaucrats' education and elite training in their use of U.S. aid (Lee, 2009; Steinberg, 1985).

Education was a core element of U.S. aid policies in Korea. The United States Military Government (USMG) set up a national committee, consisting of leading educators and other prominent citizens, to plan for a new educational system, and it started its work with a special emphasis on training teachers. In March 1949, the US State Department helped establish the National Officials Training Institute (in 1961 expanded and reorganized as the Central Officials Training Institute (COTI)), to train public officials and provided technical assistance including "leader grants" which enabled officials and scholars as well as future leaders to go abroad for training (Suh and Kim, 2014: 66). "[D]ue to Korean government's 'reverse brain-drain' policies, most of the trainees returned after completing their study and the empowered returnees played a significant role in accomplishing national industrialization plans" (ibid).

Until the 1960s, the role of the South Korean government in providing education was limited by financial shortcomings, with foreign aid largely contributing to the expansion of educational opportunities. From 1945 to 1948, two-thirds of the operating costs

of running primary schools were financed by the US Military Government (USMG) in South Korea. Foreign aid, mostly from the U.S., and amounting to US$100 million in 1952-66, provided the resources for classroom construction and thereby facilitated the quantitative expansion of student enrollment and the number of schools (McGinn, et. al., 1980). Despite financial limitations, however, the Korean government initiated a "national campaign for literacy" contributing to the increase in the adult literacy rate from 22% in 1945 to approximately 80% in 1960 (Pillay, 2010: 10). Since the 1960s, the government has focused on providing an education system based on the needs for human resources (ibid: 73).

The focus of the government's educational plan has moved from primary to secondary education and finally to the tertiary level, according to its economic advancement. For example, during the early stage of industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, during which workers with a lower level of technical skill were required, the government implemented an effort to expand vocational training and the supply of secondary school technical graduates. Later in the 1980s, to absorb more advanced technology, more support was given to two-year junior technical colleges, colleges and universities for a supply of skilled workers and technicians (Lee, 1997). Consequently, South Korea has achieved the largest global increase in human capital stock.

Education has also, however, laid the foundations upon which democratic principles and institutions are based (Pillay, 2010: 74). It has promoted political knowledge, changed political behavior patterns, and shaped political attitudes and values. Simultaneously, education has imbued the people with commitment to

modernization and citizenship. Increased educational opportunities have made upward social mobility possible, and the middle class has expanded as a result. South Korea has a history, therefore, of prioritizing human capacity building and education, while at the same time promoting rapid economic development. Education and human resource investment, as well as, through these initiatives, the development of an educated and skilled workforce, have led to rapid and sustained economic growth. But they have also contributed to political governance gains, democratic transition and consolidation. In this regard, South Korea has also achieved significant progress in the human security related aspects of development from which others could learn.

Many developing countries in the region and from further afield have been looking to learn the lessons of the Korean development experience. South Korea represents a rare case of an ODA recipient success story, a country that has overcome the dual challenges of post-conflict under-development and insecurity, a "miracle" of economic and political governance development, and a country that embraces both macro and human-centered development in its policy prioritization. It is uncertain, however, how much other countries can, or should, transfer the lessons of South Korea to their own policymaking.

Education has always held a privileged position in Korean society. In particular, the way that Confucianism was manifest in Joseon Korea was in something approaching the worship of scholars and the educational system. Traditionally the role of education in Korean society has been to raise up people who will benefit society, to provide future leaders and guides, and to develop a sense of devotion and contribution to society. Educated elites, the

"Yangbon," are revered, but also serve the general good. Thus, human resource development can be likened to a process of "yangbonization." Korea and Koreans, both the state and the citizens, continue to spend the highest ratio of their disposable income in the world on education (Howe, 2020: 23). Even in North Korea, where other aspects of human security and development languish among the lowest ranked in the world, there is still an enviably high rate of literacy. Yet other societies may not be able to manufacture such dedication to and respect for education.

At least, however, the experience of South Korea shows how education can lead to more accountable government. Korean school education has evolved to deal with such a very sensitive political issue in its curriculum. Moral education as a subject took on this difficult task. That is why even now, Korean moral education includes contents such as unification education and security education. This very practical and applied interpretation of normative principles forms the core of this volume.

Chapter Overview

The first substantive analytical chapter of this book serves as a foundation for examining the relationship between applied moral education, democracy, and civic virtue. In it, Brendan Howe assesses the vital role played by moral education, in installing values which are conducive to self-sacrifice for the common good. The central problem identified is that the nature of these values is hotly contested. The chapter first considers the values of liberal universalist human rights-based democracy, before turning to epistemological and practical challenges. This is followed by consideration of the need for moral education to instill civic virtue,

as well as to empower civil society. The final consideration concerns the tailoring of moral education to best serve the needs of a particular polity within a pluralistic international community – in this case the ROK.

Chapter 2, by Ha Jin-Bong, further develops how Korean moral education aims to cultivate students' morality. The chapter divides moral into cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects. The cognitive aspect refers to the moral knowledge of norms and values. The affective aspect refers to moral sensitivity and caring thoughts. The behavioral aspect refers to moral inquiry, moral reflection, and the consistency between moral knowledge and practical actions. Korean moral education aims to cultivate students into moral people through such a multifaceted approach. Ha contends that by measuring morality, it is possible to understand students' levels of moral development and their individual characteristics. The chapter aims to introduce a scientific and systematic method for measuring the morality of Korean adolescents. It reviews measurements of moral emotions and moral identity and explores implications that can be applied within the context of Korean moral education.

In the third substantive chapter, Yoon Junsik delves into the specific mechanics and practical application of ethics education in Korean moral education. Yoon focuses on the content of Contemporary Society and Ethics (CSE) and Inquiry on Ethical Issues (IEI) initiatives. Particular attention is given to the topics of bioethics, ecological ethics, and science/technology ethics covered in both subjects. The chapter begins with a brief review of the nature, content structure, and key ideas of the two subjects based on the 2022 Revised Moral Curriculum document, followed by a

close analysis of the units covering bioethics and science/technology ethics. Finally, the chapter discusses potential challenges, such as the methodology of practical ethics and approaches to controversial and complex issues and suggests implications for the future of practical ethics education.

In Chapter 4, Seolah Lee explores political and social topics in moral education through analysis of the "Contemporary Society and Ethics" elective subject in the 2022 Revised Curriculum for high schools. This is a successor to the subject of Life and Ethics first introduced in the 2009 revised curriculum. According to the high school curriculum guide, this subject aims to "cultivate virtues and competencies that enable students to practice an ethical life within society." The subject focuses on "developing a correct understanding of humanity and society from an ethical perspective, enhancing ethical sensitivity and judgment skills, and internalizing ethical motivations." This explicit goal is to promote moral development in the cognitive, affective, and behavioral domains. "Contemporary Society and Ethics" is divided into six detailed themes, of which the fourth theme, "Democratic Citizenship and Ethics," forms the focus of this chapter. Since this theme covers political and social thought topics, examining it provides insights into the political and social dimensions emphasized in moral education in Korea.

Chapter 5, by Byongsam Jung, evaluates the content of character education in the military academies of the Republic of Korea including the Korea Military Academy (KMA), Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon (KAAY), Korea Naval Academy (KNA), Korea Air Force Academy (KAFA), and Korea Armed Forces Nursing Academy (KAFNA). This chapter reviews each institute's

mottos, values, and representative graduates and analyzes the in-depth meanings of them. It demonstrates the great importance placed by these institutions on the notion of "character" for their effective functioning. Hence, character education in the military academies of Korea represents another aspect of the practical application of applied ethics education.

In Chapter 6, Heesun Chang further examines the status and prospects of character education in the broader societal context, in response to contemporary changes and challenges, from a lifelong learning perspective. Key concerns addressed by Chang include the advent of Chat GPT, the global outbreak of COVID-19, the advancement of low birth rates and aging populations, and the issue of social polarization. To respond to these changes, Chang highlights the necessity of creating a virtuous lifelong learning ecosystem encompassing education, employment, and welfare to improve the quality of life for citizens and to develop innovative educational models.

Byeong Yeon Kim addresses unification education in Korean schools in Chapter 7. This is a uniquely important aspect of applied ethical education in Korean society. Unification is not only specified as a national mission in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (Constitution) but is also such an important duty that it is included in the president's oath of office. The principles of unification as a moral duty are enshrined in several legal instruments in Korea. From a normative perspective, inter-Korean relations are a mixture of denial and recognition of North Korea. Kim details how changes in the perception and reality of inter-Korean relations have influenced unification education.

In Chapter 8 Seung Joo Cha turns the applied ethical lens on developments in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Cha notes that one of the most clearly detectable changes in North Korean society since Kim Jong-un came to power is the transformation within the education sector. North Korea implemented a reform of its education system through the 2012 decree "On the Implementation of Comprehensive 12-Year Compulsory Education." In addition, at the National Conference of Education Workers on September 5, 2014, Kim Jong-un presented a speech titled "Let us bring about an educational revolution in the new century and make our country shine as a country of education and a country of talent," thereby indicating a new direction for education policy. The speech also, however, emphasizes the heritage of moral educational in the DPRK, reinforcing the ideology and achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as legacies that must be inherited. This chapter, therefore, evaluates elements of continuity and change in North Korean moral education.

Chapter 9, by Park Gyun-yeol and Bang Jung-bae brings us back to the unique feature of Korean civic virtue, that of unification education. Park and Bang note that one of the most challenging tasks is to overcome the heterogeneity between North and South Korea, which has emerged because of having been divided for more than 70 years. To this end, they argue, in the future, even if the political relationship between North and South Korea changes or the security situation around the Korean Peninsula changes, the basic education on unification, that is, the definition, goals, and ideology of unification education, should be developed as a concept with universality. Accordingly, their study evaluates the current definition, goals, and ideology of unification education

and utilizes the Moral Competence Test (MCT) developed by Professor Georg Lind to measure morality regardless of changes in the situation.

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Chapter 1
Moral Education in Korea: Democracy and Civic Virtue

Brendan Howe

Introduction

Successive democratic administrations in South Korea,[1] of diverse political persuasions, have emphasized the importance of the country assuming its rightful place in the liberal international rules-based order through good global citizenship. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration (2022 - 2025) manifested this as enhancing Korea's role as a "Pivot" state. The Lee Jae-myung administration (2025-) has continued this emphasis, launching an initiative called K-Democracy which not only reflects on the resilience of liberal democracy in Korea, but also examines the extent to which it can offer valuable lessons for others (Lee, 2025). Previous administrations have emphasized "Global Korea," public diplomacy, soft power, and the extent to which Korea can act as a "shining city on the hill." Much of the Korean success story - a triple miracle on the Han River of economic development, political transformation, and resilience under conditions of conflict - was facilitated by external assistance during and after the Korean War (Howe, 2020). Koreans

[1] The terms South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Korea are used interchangeably in this chapter.

are deeply aware of this fact, and hence experience a "paying back syndrome" (Hong, 2009: 24).

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has succeeded in transforming its image from that of a recipient of official development assistance (ODA) and a subject of international governance concern, to becoming a major donor, joining the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and making contributions to global governance participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs), humanitarian assistance operations, and advancing action on climate change (Ayhan 2019; Howe and Park 2019). Korea has also hosted major global institutions such as the G20 summit, the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), as well as the World Cup and both summer and winter Olympics.

The ongoing support of the population of South Korea is necessary to maintain the triple miracle on the Han River and enhance this progress towards good global citizenship. In particular, the country needs to guard against "democratic backsliding" should the demos become disenchanted with the direction of Korean governance. If a significant proportion of the population is unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices for the common good and public value, the polity itself becomes endangered. This, then, is where moral education plays a vital role, installing values which are conducive to self-sacrifice for the common good. The problem is that the nature of these values is hotly contested.

This chapter first considers the values of liberal universalist human rights-based democracy, before turning to epistemological and practical challenges. This is followed by consideration of the need

for moral education to instill civic virtue, as well as to empower civil society. The final consideration concerns the tailoring of moral education to best serve the needs of a particular polity within a pluralistic international community – in this case the ROK.

Democratic Morals

While moral education implies the generation of "better" citizens through training in civic virtue, which morals should be instilled in the people remains essentially contested. Certainly, the concept of democracy or "rule by the people" has assumed such a positive normative value and overlapping consensus among the members of the international community, as to approach that of a normative universal consensus. In which case, for the people to exercise power over others, requires they are fit to rule. But the question remains, how best to measure fitness, and what sort of governance structures are required, for which moral education needs to be targeted?

The liberal rights-based model of democratic governance has come to dominate. Optimism about the inevitable universal triumph of liberal governance models is perhaps most famously summed up by Francis Fukuyama in his "End of History" hypothesis, whereby the demonstrated superiority of liberalism in both the economic and political realms has led to a situation where there is no rational alternative (1989). In a similar manner to that feared by Western Cold War strategists concerning the spread of communism, liberal economic and political transition has, through contagion, toppled one after another domino in the communist bloc, leaving few if any true adherents to that competing moral ideology (Whitehead, 1996).

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, around 75 per cent of the world's nearly 200 countries had democratically elected governments (Freedom House 2011). Furthermore, the "ideal" of democracy has spread across the globe with more than 90 per cent of the world's constitutions asserting democratic rule (Marquez, 2016: 22). Lucian Pye (2010: 21) notes that even the greatest enemies of democracy in practice, authoritarian governments, pay it the compliment of cynically labelling themselves as democracies, some as "people's democracies" and others as "democratic republics" (or, we could add, the combined form of People's Democratic Republic). He asserts that this fact "is proof that in the modern world the legitimacy of governments depends upon an acknowledgement of the superior virtues of democracy" (Pye, 2010: 21). Thus, democracy approaches the level of "a universal value… that people anywhere may have reason to see… as valuable" (Sen, 1999: 12).

Yet, there remain challenges, especially to the liberal universalist paradigm. First, the focus on individual human rights leaves little room for the resolution of collective action problems required by modern governance. If individual human beings are bearers of rights that "trump" all other considerations and must be jealously defended, this leaves little room for the necessary compromises in societal living. A second, related complaint is that the concept of rights is too one-sided and individualistic, encouraging us to set ourselves apart from others and at odds with a society, state, or government that is constantly seeking to intrude upon or invade our rights, rather than recognizing the societal origins of rights, and the need to act virtuously with the good of the community in mind.

Civic Virtue and Community Values

Recognizing that rights, at least in part, are socially constructed rather than pre-existing societal arrangements, we can perhaps reach a better understanding of which morals we are looking to instill within the demos of a particular country. Thus, each community generates a different concept of rights based on competing historical and cultural processes. Civic virtue, under such conditions, amounts to abiding by the historically and culturally generated norms of the society, even if they go against one's individual interests. In practical terms, collective living, actions, and governance require a degree of alienation of the individual autonomy championed by liberal individual human rights. As pointed out by Robert Audia (1998: 149):

> A democratic society cannot flourish if its citizens merely pursue their own narrow interests. If it is to do more than survive, at least a substantial proportion of its citizens must fulfill responsibilities that go beyond simply avoiding the violation of others' rights.... The vitality and success of a democracy requires that many citizens—ideally all of them—contribute something to their communities and participate responsibly in the political process. The disposition to do these things is a large part of what constitutes civic virtue.

This concept of civic virtue as a prerequisite to the adequate functioning, or even survival of republican governance based on the collective will of the people, can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle championing political duties rather than rights. Thomas Aquinas influentially restated the Aristotelian concept of virtue as

a good habit, which is the quality of a person demonstrated by his actions and reactions over a substantial period. The rights versus duty debate was reborn during the enlightenment and has perhaps reached its pinnacle in contemporary governance discourse.

For Aristotle, "The true student of politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws." [quoted in Ross, 2013: 1(13)]. "Republican virtue" emphasizes the importance of educating citizens regarding the need to sacrifice a degree of self-interest to ensure the continuance of a political system that maximizes the collective good. Yet, given that the notions of "virtue" and "collective good" are both themselves inherently normative, it is not surprising that intellectual traditions emphasizing duties to one's fellow man and to the collective have gone beyond the strictly practical, utilitarian, or even rule utilitarian demands of governance efficacy. Hence, communities not only give meaning to our lives but also largely constitute our identities, and there is a danger that we become so preoccupied with our rights that we lose sight of our responsibilities and the need to act virtuously, with the good of the community in mind.

Here then, we enter the realm of communitarianism. Communitarians address the necessity of attending to the demands of community alongside or prior to liberty and equality. In other words, we must pay attention to the shared practices and values within each society which constitute a distinct understanding of the common good, its generation, and its distribution, but also, society or community is itself a collective good which must at the very least be weighed against other rights. There are human rights, but due to the problem of the particular-

ism of history, culture, and membership, the political community to which individuals belong, rather than uninformed external interference, is the best agency for their defense.

Aristotle differentiated between two forms of democracy, the perverted version being where the poor rule the state in their own interests. Polybius referred to this as "ochlocracy" or rule by the mob (Field, 1956: 279). John Stuart Mill (1972 [1861]: 277) was profoundly concerned that in replacing old elites with new democratic forms of government, we would merely replace one form of class rule with another; that of rule by the more numerous lower classes, perpetuating class conflict:

> The constitution would therefore still be liable to the characteristic evils of class government: in a far less degree, assuredly, than the exclusive government by a class, which now usurps the name of democracy; but still, under no effective restraint, except what might be found in the good sense, moderation, and forbearance of the class itself.

Even if the masses themselves are not perceived as undesirable or even evil rulers, there still exists the danger that the masses will allow the rise of undesirable or evil individuals. There has long been a fear that the gullible masses will allow themselves to be hoodwinked by unscrupulous demagogues. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini were both raised to power by essentially democratic means, and the ambition and ruthlessness of totalitarians soon subsumed the ideals of the French Revolution.

Universal suffrage and a focus on individual rights-based governance can, ironically therefore, be seen as sowing the seeds of democratic calamity. Thus, for the Marquis de Condorcet (quoted in Baker 1975, 330), "[t]he equality of stupidity is not equality at all, for it does not exist between cheats and their dupes, and every society which is not enlightened by philosophers is deceived by charlatans." Furthermore, he (quoted by Baker 1975, 334-35) seems to hold out little hope of the democratic process in itself being able to restrain such individuals through the rule of law, noting that the more that laws "respect the rights of personal independence and natural equality, the more easy and terrible will they make the tyranny that ruse exercises over ignorance."

These dire foretellings appear to be coming to fruition in some of the bastions of Western liberal democracy. The principles of democratic governance are increasingly seen as threatened by the rise of populism and radical right-wing political movements, as embodied by the election of Donald Trump in the United States (the toxic legacy of his defeat, and his re-election in 2024), the victory of Brexit campaigners in the UK, and similar political developments in Italy and Hungary (Rapoza, 2019). While Boris Vormann and Christian Lammert (2019) argue that the rise of populism in North Atlantic states is not the cause of a crisis of governance but its result, nevertheless, there is something of a consensus among notable scholars that Western liberal democracy faces unprecedented challenges (see *inter alia* Diamond, 2019; Toplišek, 2019; and van Beek, 2019).

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2021: 4) has noted that, while democracy has not been in robust health for some time, the global average score has now hit an all-time low. "The average

global score in the 2020 Democracy Index fell from 5.44 in 2019 to 5.37" in large part, but not solely, because of government reactions to the COVID-19 crisis, and this is "by far the worst global score since the index was first produced in 2006" (ibid.). In 2020, 116 out of a total of 167 countries evaluated (almost 70 percent) recorded a decline in their total score compared with 2019, with only 38 recording an improvement and the other 13 stagnating, with their scores remaining unchanged compared with 2019 (ibid.: 5).

The Need for Moral Education

What then can and should be done about the crisis of democratic governance and the challenge of pro-authoritarian populism? One proposal is for placing constitutional limits upon the degree to which the people exercise power over their fellow citizens for them to avoid falling prey to unscrupulous populist demagogues. This is what is currently being debated regarding the AFD in Germany, although banning of any political party is itself a very serious threat to the democratic process. Indeed, any form of limiting democratic engagement can be seen as at best, morally ambiguous.

Instead, this chapter emphasizes the need for a civic education in democratic responsibility, for strong democratic practices that serve as an apprenticeship for liberty, and for the opening of all political questions to extensive discussion and ultimately responsible and reflective democratic decision-making. As Thomas Jefferson (quoted by Barber, 1984: xvii) said:

> I know of no safe depository of the ultimate power of the society but the people themselves, and if we think them not enlight-

> ened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.

Moral education for civic virtue involves, therefore, training in the values necessary for participation in the democratic process and the exercise of power over one's fellow citizens, as well as a commitment to the collective good. Bearing in mind the cultural relativism inherent in the social construction of polities, however, moral education in support of good governance remains dependent on the particularities of the political community being considered. Thus, we must assess the unique characteristics of the Korean polity to assess challenges to civic virtue as well as prescriptions for moral education within that community.

It is in this context that we need to cast a new light on "democracy as a dual process" comprising institutional reforms and popular social movements, as two closely interrelated processes of democratization (Han and Howe, 2023). Related to this, moral education for civic responsibility must focus on two objectives: The first is to alter the state in such a manner that "the extension and the deepening of political freedoms and representative democracy are fostered, whereas the second task lies in unfurling direct democracy and proliferating self-managed bodies in civil society" (Poulantzas, 1978: 250). For David Held (1987: 283):

> For democracy to flourish today it has to be reconceived as a double-sided phenomenon: concerned, on the one hand, with the reform of state power and, on the other hand, with the restructuring of civil society. The principle of autonomy can only be enacted by recognizing the indispensability of a process